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A series of studies has found that relative wages and employment rates in different local 
labor markets of the US are surprisingly unaffected by local factor supplies.  This paper 
evaluates two explanations for this puzzling empirical fact:  (1) Interregional trade mitigates 
the local impact of supply shocks. (2) Production technology rapidly adapts to the local mix 
of workers.  I test these alternative explanations by estimating the effect of increases in 
relative supplies of particular skill groups on the relative growth rates of different industries 
and on the relative utilization of these skill groups within industries.  Labor supply shocks 
are identified with a component of foreign immigration driven by the historical regional 
settlement patterns of immigrants from different countries.   Using establishment-level 
output and capital stock data from the Longitudinal Research Database, augmented with 
employment and labor force data from the 1980 and 1990 Censuses of Population, changes 
in local labor supply during the 1980s are shown to have had little influence on local industry 
mix.  Instead, citywide increases in the relative supply of a particular skill group lead to 
increases in relative factor intensity, with little or no effect on relative wages. These patterns 
suggest that industries adapt their use of labor inputs to local supplies, as predicted by 
theoretical models of endogenous technological change.  Consistent with this interpretation, 
on-the-job computer use expanded most rapidly over the 1980s in cities where the relative 
supply of educated labor grew fastest. 
 
JEL J2, F1, O3. 
Keywords: Immigration, Heckscher-Ohlin, Endogenous Technological Change     3 
1. Introduction and Background 
How do local labor markets respond to changes in the relative supplies of different types of 
labor?  The simple closed-economy supply-demand framework fits the data poorly: wages 
and employment rates are  consistently  unresponsive to local labor supply mix in 
comparisons across regions of the US.  Moreover, a number of careful empirical studies 
have found that large-scale inflows of immigrants have little impact on wages or 
employment rates of competing natives. (Surveys include Borjas (1994) and Friedberg and 
Hunt (1995).)  For example, the relative wages of less-educated workers evolved similarly in 
California labor markets and in other parts of the US during the 1980s at the same time as 
California’s markets took on a massive net increase in the relative supply of less-educated 
labor, due largely to immigration.
1 
 
Motivated by this empirical puzzle, this paper evaluates the importance of mechanisms other 
than changes in factor prices or employment rates for responding to changes in the local 
supply of labor.  I focus on two explanations: (1) US cities are not closed economies, but are 
better described as Heckscher-Ohlin (hereafter, “HO”) open economies, which can trade 
away local skill imbalances by specializing in production; and (2) production technology 
adapts to the local skill mix of workers. 
 
In the HO model, local imbalances in labor supply are accommodated by exporting goods 
intensive in the relevant labor type.  In the most extreme version, local industry structure 
adjusts enough so that local labor supply has no impact on relative wages or employment 
                                                 
1 This will be demonstrated below.     4 
rates.  Although this possibility has been noted by several authors (including Borjas, 
Freeman and Katz (1996)), it remains largely untested in the context of US labor markets.  
HO theory has not been particularly successful in describing differences across countries.
2  
At the international level, however, deviations from HO assumptions (no trade barriers, 
identical technologies) are substantial.  Different US cities are more likely to satisfy these 
assumptions.  In this regard, the present paper follows recent work that evaluates HO within 
countries (Davis et. al (1997) in Japan; Hanson and Slaughter (2002) and Quispe-Agnoli and 
Zavodny (2002) in the US; and Bernard, Redding et. al (2002) in the UK).
3 
 
The second alternative is that worker productivity differs across localities.  A paper by 
Trefler (1993), motivated by the empirical failure of HO, shows that allowing countries to 
have factor-specific productivity differences common to all industries generates a consistent 
fit to the cross-country trade and factor price data.
4  For this theory to explain the limited 
responsiveness of wages and employment rates to local labor supply in the US,  local 
productivity differences must be driven by a phenomenon  that raises the relative 
productivities of a given labor type with an increase in its relative supply.  A phenomenon 
fitting this description  appears in a  recent model by Acemoglu (2002): technology  is 
endogenously chosen to complement the work force.
5  Acemoglu’s  research  repeats a 
                                                 
2 Davis et al. (1997) called it a “flop.” 
3 Besides intercity goods trade, it is possible that skill imbalances generated by immigration could be 
accommodated by intercity labor flows.  However, as shown below, in many less-skilled immigrant cities, like 
LA and Miami, the relative supply of less-skilled workers grew tremendously compared to other cities.  In any 
case, this issue can also be addressed by focusing on the overall skill mix of the local labor force, rather than 
just the part due to foreign immigration.  This is the approach taken here. 
4 Hanson and Slaughter’s (2002) interpret changes across US states during the 1980s as support Trefler’s 
version of HO.   
5 Another explanation is that observed labor flows are in part an endogenous response to local demand (Borjas 
(1994) and Borjas, Freeman and Katz (1996)).  This problem is addressed in the literature by using instruments 
for immigrant inflows based on historical settlement patterns, with the general finding that the estimated     5 
common explanation for the puzzling recent coincidence of rising supply and relative wages 
of college graduates – it was driven by the spread of “skill-biased” technologies, which 
replace unskilled and complement skilled workers – but innovatively conjectures that skill-
biased technological change may have been in part an endogenous response to the growing 
availability of more educated workers.  In this view, computer technology became more cost 
effective and thus became widespread as the work force became more educated.
6  In 
comparisons across labor markets, therefore, skill-biased technologies may be most 
prevalent where the relative supply of skilled labor is rising most rapidly. 
 
In this paper, I analyze changes in local supplies of four skill groups (defined by education) 
across major metropolitan areas. I decompose relative supply changes in each of the cities 
over the 1980s into an expansion of the industries that tend to employ a given type of labor, 
and changes in the intensity of its use within industries.  The former supports an HO 
description of the world, while the latter – absent relative wage changes – is consistent with 
the idea that  factor-biased technical change accommodates the changes in skill mix.  To 
further examine the latter explanation, I also examine how changes in local labor supply 
affect on-the-job computer use. 
 
I examine the question in two contexts.  I start by examining industrial changes in several 
California cities and Miami where, atypical of the rest of the country, the availability of high 
                                                                                                                                                 
impacts remain small.  Moreover, studies of massive refugee flows (such as the Mariel boatlift) would seem to 
be immune from the endogeneity problem, and yet show similarly small effects of local labor supply on wages. 
6Acemoglu also quotes Habakkuk’s (1962) observation that in the  19th century, skill-replacing factory-style 
production may have been introduced because unskilled labor became plentiful in cities.  In the present cross-
city context, Acemoglu’s (2002) model might say that where low-skill immigration reduced the relative supply 
of skilled labor, computers were less cost-effective and therefore introduced more slowly, reducing downward 
pressure on low-skill wages.     6 
school dropouts grew during the 1980s (due largely to immigration).  To control for 
unobserved determinants of labor mix in these cities, I compare them with another group of 
labor markets matched on their industrial mix at the beginning of the decade.  Second, I use 
a regression framework to evaluate how changes in labor mix in 179 US metropolitan areas 
during the 1980s impacted their mix of industries, or, alternatively, their skill mix within 
industries.  An instrumental variables strategy is used to identify exogenous changes in 
worker mix in this part of the analysis, where the instrument derives from the settlement 
patterns of immigrants across metropolitan labor markets in 1970. 
 
For the purposes of evaluating HO, special attention is given to the response of industries in 
the manufacturing sector, as it is a major traded goods sector and because detailed data are 
available: I will use firm-level output and capital stock data from the confidential micro data 
version of the Annual Surveys of  Manufactures available in the Census Bureau’s 
Longitudinal Research D atabase.  I supplement this with data on other sectors, using 
employment data from the 1980 and 1990 Census of Population (which I show performs 
similarly to output and capital data for manufacturing).  The population censuses are also 
used to measure the growth in labor availability in US metropolitan areas. 
 
I find in each case that while changes in labor supply have some influence on the mix of 
industries (for example, apparel tends to grow with the supply of less-educated labor), these 
responses are typically small in comparison to the supply changes.  I find that industries that 
employ dropouts in California cities and in Miami did not grow, on average, any faster than 
in matched comparison cities, even though the former group took on unusually large     7 
numbers of less-educated workers during the 1980s.   Across the 179 metropolitan areas, 
cities that received more of one type of labor had little greater tendency than other cities to 
“grow” industries that tend to employ it. 
  
In contrast to the relatively unresponsive patterns of industry growth, the skill intensity of 
most industries is highly responsive to city-specific changes in skill mix.  An increase in the 
relative supply of some type of labor leads to an increased intensity of its use across a wide 
range of industries that is, on average, around 80 percent as large as the supply change.  
Unexpected sectors like finance and professional services took on a relatively greater share 
of dropout labor where it was locally abundant.
7  In a standard model this increase in relative 
use within industry would imply relative wage changes, but similar to previous research, I 
find that wages are relatively unresponsive to local supply, lending support to the idea that 
there were accommodating changes in production  technology.  Consistent with this, 




2. Empirical Framework 
This section presents a framework for evaluating the impact of labor supply shocks on a 
local labor market.  Start with the identity that the supply of workers of type i is the sum of 
the employment of these workers in each sector  j,  plus any 
unemployment ￿ + = + =
j i ij i i i U N U  N L .  This paper analyzes the response of 
                                                 
7 Similar results occur within narrow occupations – the education of workers hired for particular occupations 
appears to depend heavily on the education mix of the local work force (Lewis (2003)).     8 
employment to the growth of different labor inputs, so taking the first difference of both sides 
of and dividing through by  i L  produces the employment growth identity: 
 
(1)  i iU j ij ij i
i
i U s N s   L  
L
L
D + D = D =
D
￿ % % % 0 0  
 
where  0 0 0 i ij ij L N s =  and  0 0 0 i i iU L U s =  are the initial shares of type-i workers employed 
in sector j and unemployed.  Next, employment growth is further decomposed into industry 
mix changes and changes in type-i labor intensity.  So let  j M  be a measure of the size or 
scale of sector j such as output or total employment.  This relates to type-i employment in 
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So the growth in type-i employment in sector-j can be decomposed into the growth in scale 
of the sector,  j M D % , holding constant factor intensity, and the growth in the number of 













%  (i.e. growth in the type-i labor intensity of the 
sector) holding constant industry scale.  Where each component is held constant matters for 
                                                 
8 Note that summed across sectors this is the usual HO accounting identity.  Different measures of scale are 
equivalent with this type of measure under the assumption of constant returns to scale.     9 
the decomposition; a  third term,  not uniquely assignable to either of the first two 
components, gives the full range of possible decompositions.
9 
 
Substituting this expression into (1) produces a general decomposition of the growth in type-
i labor force: 
 




























D + D = D ￿ ￿ ￿ % % % % % % 0 0 0 0  
 
There are four terms in this decomposition: 
(1) Growth in the scale of the average type-i employing industry, at fixed factor ratios; 
(2) Growth in the average type-i employing industry’s type-i intensity, for a fixed mix of 
industries; 
(3) A term consisting of (1) and (2) (it cannot be uniquely assigned to either);
10 and 
(4) Growth in unemployment 
 
The first term measures changes in labor mix absorbed “between” industries, and the second 
term “within” industries.  HO is a full employment model, in which (absent exogenous 
technical change, considered below) factor prices are determined externally, so each sector’s 
factor intensities are unaffected by labor supply.  Thus, according to HO: 
                                                 
9 This type of decomposition customarily is evaluated at the mean of the two periods, which implicitly assigns 
half of this third term to each of the first two components.  This makes it appear in other work that there is a 
unique decomposition into “within” industry and “between” industry components.  (Examples include Hanson 
and Slaughter (2002) and Autor, Katz and Krueger (1998).)  I instead take the approach of writing down this 
general identity, and then showing that in practice the third “ambiguous” term is small; thus any kind of 
decomposition would give roughly the same answer. 
10 In practice, this third term also includes industries whose base year scale is so small (or 0) that it is impossible 
to get a reliable estimate of its growth.     10 
 
(3)  ￿ D = D
j j ij i M s   L % % 0  
 
One way to describe the prediction of HO, then, is that in the long run, the industries that 
tend to employ some factor grow, on average, as much as the supply of that factor.
11  If this 
is not true, then there are by definition changes in skill intensity within industry or higher 
rates of unemployment. 
 
Empirical Implementation 
Several issues complicate empirical assessment of (2).  First among these is that the skill 
intensity of sectors may change over time for exogenous reasons (i.e. technical change), 
implying the second and third terms of equation (2) may not actually be 0 even in a world 
where HO held perfectly.  To validly evaluate the HO model, it is necessary to control for 
counterfactual changes in skill intensity.  One approach I will take is to compare regions that 
are initially similar in industry structure but which faced different relative labor supply 
changes.  In the regressions of section 5 the influence of changes in production technology 
is modeled as a skill-group fixed effect common to all cities plus idiosyncratic local noise 
assumed to be orthogonal to the labor shocks.  In both cases the key assumption is that 
technology shocks are similar across cities. 
 
                                                 
11 This is the “Rybczynski theorem” (see Leamer (1995) for a good description) written in growth terms.     11 
A second empirical issue is that not all goods are traded – some are local.
12  Ethier (1972) 
shows that in this case industry mix changes take place entirely through the traded sector, so 
the right-hand side of (3) is modified to include only traded sectors.
13  In this paper I give 
special attention to the adjustments in the manufacturing sector. 
 
Another problem is that growth in the scale of the economy can generate an apparent 
relationship between factor supplies and industry growth by raising both simultaneously.  
Such a relationship would occur even in an economy closed to goods trade.  This can be 
addressed by controlling for changes in the scale of the economy. 
 
The biggest problem is that while we are interested in estimating how labor supply shocks 
are absorbed, differences in labor demand across localities may confound the relationship.   
For example, a local increase in consumer demand for some good would lead to an 
expansion of that sector and might also draw  suitable  workers into the  market, 
simultaneously raising both sides of equation (3)  and  making it appear that increased 
quantities of labor generated industry growth, when in fact the causality was the other way.   
In addition, local factor-specific or industry-factor-specific productivity shocks could draw 
workers into a locality; these types of demand shocks would raise the second and third terms 
                                                 
12In fact, this potentially affects the HO result itself:  as modeled in Ethier (1972) and Komiya (1967), the 
arrival of new workers affects demand for local goods, which affects the inputs available to traded industries.  
In extreme cases, this can lead to a failure of the theorem; however, Ethier (1972) showed that if the ratio of 
marginal to average propensity to consume for the non-traded good does not exceed the inverse of capital’s 
share of inc ome, HO continues to hold.  Homothetic preferences are sufficient for this. 
13 Technically one should also adjust changes in labor supply to account for what is absorbed into the non-
traded sector.  However, using the actual change in non-traded employment is problematic because it may be 
endogenous to the overall supply change in a more general framework than HO.  One approach would be to 
use the theoretical change in non-traded employment under HO consistent assumptions, e.g. homotheticity.  It 
is worth noting that at least for the specifications I have tried, adjusting labor supply changes for either actual 
or theoretical employment changes in the non-traded sector does not substantially alter the empirical results of 
this paper.     12 
of (2).  Both concerns will be addressed by attempting to identify exogenous sources of 




This paper uses three primary sources of data: labor force and employment data from the 
1990 and 1980 Census of Population 5 percent microsample (PUMS) and manufacturing 
data from the Annual Survey of Manufactures (ASM).  The 1970 Census of Population 1 
percent county group files are used to construct the instrument, described in section 5. 
 
This section describes the ASM; further details on how these data were linked for this 
project can be found in the data appendix. 
 
Longitudinal Research Database Survey Designs 
The ASM data used in this project were made available in the Census Bureau’s Longitudinal 
Research Database (LRD), a confidential dataset that links establishment-level survey data 
from Censuses of Manufactures, (CM) occurring once every five years (in years ending in 
“2” and “7”) and the Annual Survey of Manufactures (ASM), occurring every year.
14  This 
project uses the ASM data.  An establishment is (usually) defined as a physical location 
where production takes place.
15 
                                                 
14 The description of the L RD and the ASM in this section is based upon LRD documentation (US 
Department of Commerce (1999)), appendices to the Census Bureau’s industry series reports, (for example, US 
Department of Commerce (2002)) and ASM and CM survey forms, available on the Census Bureau’s web site.  
15 It sometimes happens that a single large establishment produces distinct product lines; when the amounts are 
significant, the Census Bureau attempts to treat each product line within the same physical location as a 
separate establishment.     13 
 
The ASM, whose survey design goal is to produce reliable aggregate statistics on shipments 
by industry, collects detailed shipment, cost, and asset information from a sample of 
manufacturing establishments each year.  Beginning two years after a CM, firms are selected 
to be in the ASM using the previous CM as the sampling frame.  Large establishments, and 
ones that produce a large share of any industry’s output, are always included in the ASM.   
Very small establishments are excluded from the survey.  Among medium establishments, a 
random sample is drawn, stratified on firm size.  Once selected, an establishment is surveyed 
every year (unless it shuts down) for the subsequent five years.  It is not quite correct to call 
this a panel, however.  To maintain the representativeness of the sample, the ASM may add 




A weakness of the ASM is that very small firms are not observed, and since the present 
project is concerned with measuring aggregate growth in each industry, it would be a 
problem  if small manufacturing firms were where much of the action was.  ASM 
documentation reports that the data are representative of the vast majority of production; in 
addition, results obtained using data that do not have this weakness are quite similar. 
 
                                                 
16 Lists of enterprises come from IRS and Social Security Administration records. In addition, the Census 
Bureau surveys manufacturing enterprises to obtain lists of new establishments opened by multi-unit 
enterprises.  Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh (1991) present evidence that the Bureau is not entirely successful in 
maintaining the representativeness of the sample within a panel but also show that long-term employment 
growth, measured between panels, is unbiased.     14 
Measuring Output and Capital in the ASM 
Output or value added in the ASM is measured as the total value of shipments minus 
materials and energy costs (with adjustments for inventory changes).   This definition avoids 
the double counting of intermediate goods produced in the manufacturing sector.  Capital 
stock is measured as the end-of-year book value of equipment and structures. 
 
 
4. An Examination of Dropout-Receiving Cities 
During the 1980s, the proportion of workers with less than a high school education declined 
rapidly in most parts of the US, but in much of California and in Miami, the relative supply 
of dropouts stayed roughly constant or even increased.  This was due mostly to the influx of 
Cuban migrants to Miami (especially during the Mariel boatlift) and the accelerating wave of 
Mexican immigration to California.  This section examines how these cities adapted to their 
growing relative abundance of high school dropout workers.  Did high school dropout 
employment rates  or wages  face relative decline?  Did  dropout-intensive industries 
experience relative growth?  Were dropouts employed relatively more intensively?  Or was it 
some of each? 
 
Table 1 lists the major metropolitan areas with the largest relative increases in high school 
dropout labor force during the 1980s, which will be analyzed in this section.  The first 
column of the table shows the growth in labor supply of high school dropouts relative to     15 
non-dropouts over the 1980s, the measure on which these cities were selected for analysis.
17  
Los Angeles and Anaheim metro areas experienced the largest relative growth in dropout 
labor supply, 12 percent and 9 percent, respectively; Miami experienced a 4 percent growth.  
The region consisting of the seven “treatment” cities averaged a 7 percent relative growth in 
high school dropout supply.  In contrast, the continental US experienced a 43 percent 
decline in its dropout labor force per capita relative to other types of workers.
18  The unusual 
growth in dropout work force in these cities is associated with foreign immigration: column 
4 shows the immigrant labor force grew by 70 percent in per capita terms in the average of 
the dropout-receiving cities, compared to half as much in the continental US.  In addition, 
column 5 shows that the relative availability of high school dropout workers among natives 
declined at similar rates in these cities as in the lower 48 states (by 32 percent in the dropout 
receiving cities; 37 percent in the continental US). 
 
The main region that dropout-receiving cities will be compared to is not the rest of the 
continental US, however, but a group of “comparison” cities (listed in a footnote to the 
table), chosen because they initially (i.e. in 1980) employed high school dropouts in a similar 
mix of industries: the vector of dropout employment shares across industries was similar in 
the comparison cities as in the dropout-receiving cities in 1980.
19  An advantage of this 
                                                 
17Three smaller metro areas, (Yakima, WA; Merced, CA and Visalia, CA) also would fit into this list, but they 
were not used in the analysis, and doing so would not alter the results.  Smaller cities were also excluded from 
the comparison group. 
18 Because of their geographic separation, Alaska and Hawaii are excluded from all of the analysis in this paper.   
However, including them (for example, adding Anchorage and Honolulu metropolitan areas to the regressions 
in the next section) has little effect on the results. 
19 A Euclidian distance measure was used to find the comparison cities.  Letting sijT be the share of dropouts in 
industry j in the dropout receiving cities in 1980, and sijC is the share of dropouts in industry j in the city c (not 
in T) in 1980, the comparison region was chosen by c hoosing cities with the smallest value of Sj(sijT – sijC)2.  
Philadelphia was the best match on this measure.  How far down the list of “matches” one goes in constructing 
the comparison group is immaterial to the results that follow.     16 
choice of comparison region is that national industry demand shocks should have a similar 
impact on the employment of high school dropouts  in the treatment and comparison 
regions.  In addition, the education mix of workers and the unemployment rate of high 
school dropouts were similar in both regions in 1980.
20  The overall relative decline in high 
school dropout supply in the comparison cities is also similar to the trend in the nation as a 
whole.  In each comparison city, including the other California cities (Oakland, San Diego), 
the relative supply of dropouts fell over the decade. 
 
Overall, the dropout workforce grew by 7 percent in the treatment cities and declined 44 
percent in the comparison cities, a 51 percentage point difference, shown in the last row of 
the table.  Given this and the initial similarity of their labor markets, we might expect to see 
some difference in the evolution of wages or employment rates of high school dropouts 
between the two regions.  However, columns 2 and 3 of Table 1 show the wages and 
employment rates of dropouts relative to non-dropouts evolved similarly over the decade in 
each region.  The relative wages of high school dropouts fell by 22 percent in the dropout-
receiving cities, part of a national trend of falling wages for less-skilled workers: 
dropout/non-dropout relative wages also fell by 26 percent nationally and by 20 percent in 
the comparison cities.  The difference between the two regions in the growth of the relative 
wages of dropouts is statistically insignificant.  There is also only slight evidence of negative 
impact on employment: relative employment/labor force rates for high school dropouts fell 
by 3 percent in the dropout-receiving cities and 2  percent elsewhere,  a difference that is 
                                                 
20 Around 13 percent of dropouts were unemployed in 1980 in both regions.     17 
small (but statistically significant).
21  It is particularly small relative to the 51 percentage point 
difference in relative supply growth of dropouts.  While one can never rule out that the 
influx of dropouts to these California cities and to Miami was demand driven, and that in its 
absence relative wages and employment rates of dropouts would have grown, it seems more 
plausible mechanisms other than changes in wages or employment rates were involved in the 
adjustment of these labor markets to the influx.  I now turn to the examination of two 
particular types of adjustments:  changes in industry mix and changes in production 
technology. 
 
Decomposing the Growth of Dropouts 
As was introduced above in equation (2), one can decompose the growth in the supply of 
dropouts into the growth in the average industry’s size, the growth in the average industry’s 
dropout intensity, an ambiguous term, and the growth in unemployment.  Ignoring for the 
moment the third and fourth terms, I will rewrite (2) as follows for the present analysis: 
 
(2') ( ) ( )
C dropout T dropout P L P L D - D - D - D % % % %
 















































% % % %
 
      + other terms 
 
                                                 
21 Growth in other employment measures, such as participation rates, was also similar in both regions.     18 
( ) ( )
C dropout T dropout P L P L D - D - D - D % % % %  represents the growth of dropout workers in 
excess of population ( P D %  is included to absorb changes in city scale) in the dropout-
receiving cities, T, relative to the comparison cities, C.  This measure of the relative growth 
of dropout labor supply has a value of 0.56.
22  This can be decomposed into the relative 
growth in the size of the average dropout-employing industry (first term) plus the growth in 
dropout intensity within industries (second term), plus unemployment (not shown).
23  Note 
that this decomposition is simplified by the fact that shares of dropouts employed in each 
industry 
1980
, j dropout s  are, by design, initially approximately equal in the dropout-receiving cities 
and the comparison cities.
24 
 
It is convenient to normalize ( 2') by  dividing by 
( ) ( )
C dropout T dropout P L P L D - D - D - D % % % % , so that each term represents the share of the 
relative growth in dropouts absorbed within or between industries.  For example, the first 
term in the decomposition becomes: 
 
(3')  ( ) ( )









D - D - D - D
D - D - D - D
j
C dropout T dropout
C j T j
T j dropout P L P L
P M P M
s
% % % %
% % % %
1980
, ,  
 
                                                 
22I will refer to this as the “growth in the relative supply of dropouts” though to be strictly speaking true, the 
growth in population term should be replaced by the growth of non-dropout labor.  The distinction would be 
of concern here if the growth in labor force per population by non-dropouts differed substantially between the 
treatment and comparison cities, but this is not the case.  In particular, Table 1 shows the difference in the 
growth in the supply of dropouts relative to other workers was 0.51, which not that different from 0.56. 
23The third non-strict part of the decomposition will turn out to be empirically unimportant in this case.  
24 And the fact that the unemployment rate of dropouts was initially approximately equal in the two regions.  
The shares for the dropout-receiving cities are used in the analysis.     19 
The term in brackets  measures the growth of industry  j in the dropout-receiving cities 
relative to the comparison cities, indexed by the relative growth in the supply of high school 
dropout labor.  A value of one means that an industry grew by enough to maintain its share 
of dropout employment without altering labor-use ratios.  The average of this index over all 
industries (weighted by the initial employment share of dropouts, 
1980
, , T j dropout s ) measures the 
share of new dropouts absorbed by changes in industry mix, i.e.  the “between” industry 
share.  For the open economy model to be empirically successful, this share should be large. 
 
I begin by displaying this industry growth index separately for each industry.  Figure 1 plots 
normalized output  (Q)  growth (
( ) ( )
( ) ( )C dropout T dropout
C j T j
P L P L
P Q P Q
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
- - -
- - -
)  against initial employment share 
1980
, , T j dropout s  for each 3-digit manufacturing industry.
25  For readability, the x-axis has been 
scaled logarithmically.  The figure includes industries that are declining and industries that 
are growing, some by more than twice as much as the relative supply of dropouts.  The 
manufacturing industry that is the biggest employer of dropouts – apparel – grew as fast as 
the supply of dropouts, which lends some support to HO.  A similar stylized fact was 
noticed by Leamer and Levinsohn (1995) about one of the cities being examined  – Los 
Angeles – and was taken by them as evidence in favor of HO.  But it is evident in Figure 1 
that the typical manufacturing industry did not experience relative growth. 
 
What about industries outside manufacturing?  The manufacturing sector in aggregate is less 
than a third of dropout employment; so Figure 1 might be missing growing industries.  
                                                 
25 A few industries were so small in this region that publishing  their data would violate confidentiality rules.  
For these sectors, the data point is suppressed.  These sectors, however, are included in the weighted averages 
in Table 1.2.     20 
Recall, however, that in order to support the open economy model, the growing sectors 
must produce goods or services that are exportable.  Many of the other big industries that 
employ dropouts in Miami and California, such as household services and construction, 
cannot be convincingly called “traded goods.”  Nevertheless, I will look for evidence of 
dropout-absorbing changes in industry mix using all industries. 
 
Because equivalent measures of output are not available for non-manufacturing sectors, here 
I switch to using PUMS data on total employment as the measure of industry size.  In other 
words, I substitute for the output growth index the following employment growth index: 
 
( ) ( )
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C dropout T dropout
C j T j
P L P L
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where  j N D %  represents total employment growth of industry  j.  Among manufacturing 
industries this index grows similarly to the output growth index: an OLS regression across 
industries of the output growth index on the employment growth index does not reject that 
a slope 1, intercept 0 line goes through the points.   In addition, the largest sectors appear to 
have very similar changes in both datasets. 
 
Figure 2 plots the employment growth index against the 1980 dropout employment share for 
each industry.  The growth in household workers and agriculture is particularly striking in 
this figure, but once again, the points are centered around zero.  The two biggest employers     21 
of dropouts, construction and restaurants, shown no pattern of relative expansion in the 
high dropout growth cities. 
 
The impact of the changes shown in Figures 1 and 2 is summarized in the first column of 
Table 2, which shows the dropout share-weighted average of the industry growth indexes 
(see (3')).  Recall that this measures the share of the growth in the supply of dropouts 
absorbed by changes in industry mix.  The -0.04 in the first row, for example, says that -4 
percent of the relative growth in dropouts was absorbed by changes in relative sizes of 
manufacturing industries, as measured by output.  Measuring industry growth with 
employment produces a statistically insignificant estimate of 1 percent among manufacturing 
industries and –12 percent using all industries.  In summary, it does not appear that the 
influx of less-skilled workers to certain California metropolitan areas and to Miami during 
the 1980s was associated with a change in the mix of industries that might have 
accommodated these new workers. 
 
Dropout Intensity 
Since it doesn’t appear that dropout-intensive sectors were growing relatively faster in the 
high dropout growth cities, some sectors in these cities must have become relatively more 
intensive in their use of dropouts.  To confirm this, the second column of Table 2 measures 
the impact of increases in dropout intensity on the relative employment of dropouts, i.e. the 
second term of the decomposition: 
     22 
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( j j j N Q M , ”  as labeled.)  Table 2 shows that increases in dropouts per dollar of 
manufacturing output accounts for 37 percent of the growth in the supply of these workers, 
more than manufacturing’s 30 percent initial share of dropout employment.  Looking at the 
employment data, the average industry became more dropout-intensive by a factor 0.83 as 
large as supply.  Put another way, this says that 83 percent of the rise in the supply of 
dropouts went into an increase in the dropout-intensity of the average industry,  or 83 
percent was absorbed “within” industry. 
 
It is also striking how widely spread across industries these changes were.  To see this, Figure 
3 plots the normalized relative growth in the fraction of employment that is dropouts for all 
industries – the term in brackets above – against the initial employment shares, 
1980
, , T j dropout s .  It 
shows that even unlikely sectors such as finance and real estate seem to have taken on more 
dropout workers.  A majority of the points cannot be statistically distinguished from the 
mean of 0.83; if anything, the smallest dropout-employing sectors took on dropouts at a 
faster rate.
26  (This is shown as the downward sloping line estimated through the points.)  
Not surprisingly, construction was able to take on more than its share of dropouts, but 
                                                 
26 Note that this could also be due to “regression to the mean” – industries whose employment of high school 
dropouts was underestimated in 1980 would experience, on average, apparently larger within-industry growth 
of high school dropouts during the decade.  A similar result is obtained when national base year shares are used 
in place of local ones, suggesting that regression to the mean is probably only part of the source for this result.     23 
industries that one might expect would be able to flexibly make use of additional dropouts, 
like retail apparel and hotels and movie theaters, downskilled less rapidly than other sectors. 
 
There are two additional pieces of the decomposition that have, thus far, been ignored.  The 
first is an ambiguous growth term that cannot neatly be classified into strictly industry mix 
changes or dropout intensity changes (see section 2).  This term is near zero.  The remainder 
– around 25 percent – is absorbed by higher rates of unemployment for dropouts.
27 
 
In short, it appears that most of the relative increase in the availability of dropout workers in 
these California cities and in Miami in the 1980s can be accounted for by increased use of 
dropouts in all different industries, with the remainder ending up in unemployment.  There 
appears to be very little change in industry mix.   Recall also that industries found productive 
uses for these added dropouts, as evidenced by the fact that their relative wages did not fall. 
 
In the next section I will present evidence that this result is not particular to these cities or to 
dropouts.  In general, changes in industry mix are not a big part of how metropolitan areas 
absorbed changes in worker mix during the 1980s. 
 
5.  Metropolitan Areas During the 1980s 
This section uses a regression framework to ask whether changes in the skill composition in 
179 US metropolitan areas during the 1980s caused accommodating changes in industry mix, 
                                                 
27 At first blush this might appear to be inconsistent with the small decline in employment in Table 1, but note 
that the base for changes in employment rates is all dropouts, not just the new arrivals.  Thus even a small 
decrease in employment rates can absorb a substantial fraction of new workers.  Similar results are obtained in 
the next section.     24 
or changes in the factor intensity of industries.  Since this mirrors regressions used in the so-
called “area analysis” approach to measuring the impact of immigration (e.g. Card (2001)), I 
begin by showing that changes in skill mix also appear to have little impact on wages or 
employment in my data.  Tables 3 shows estimates of employment rate and wage elasticities 
derived from regressions of the form:
28 
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where  ( )ic L N D % represents the percent change in the employment/labor force and 
ic w D % represents changes in the real wage during the 1980s for education group i in city c.   
There are four skill g roups,  i, based on workers’ self-reported final level of schooling: 
workers with less than a high school education, exactly a high school education, with some 
college education (but without a 4-year college degree), and with a bachelor’s degree or 
more.  The top panel contains elasticities estimated across 179 metropolitan areas, using an 
OLS regression.
29  The estimates confirm that labor supply has little impact on relative 
employment rates, as has been found in numerous other studies.  The wage elasticity is 
estimated to be minus 0.03, which implies an elasticity of substitution between these groups 
larger than 30.    Larger relative supply growth of  a given education group is also  not 
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29 All metropolitan areas within the lower 48 states that were either among the top 100 recipients of working 
age foreign-born arrivals during the 1980s or had at least 1 percent of their population in 1990 arrived from a 
foreign country during the 1980s.  Very few metropolitan areas were dropped under these criteria that would 
not otherwise have to be dropped because of difficulties in matching metropolitan areas across datasets.  A 
small number of less populous metro areas in New England were dropped separately because there was no 
feasible way to construct them consistently using both the PUMS and ASM data.     25 
systematically associated with a lower employment rate of that group in these cities, shown 
in column 2. 
 
One concern with these estimates that can be immediately addressed is that cross-regional 
differences in the change in labor mix may be driven in part by differential growth in relative 
labor demand.  To identify an exogenous component of observed changes in labor mix, I 
use an instrument similar to Card’s (2001).  It is motivated by the observation that 
immigrants tend to settle in areas of the US among people from their home country (Bartel 
(1989)).  This idea can be used to create a measure of the “supply-push” component of 
foreign immigration, by assigning recent immigrants to the cities where their countrymen 
were living at some point in the past.  At a point far enough in the past, it is hoped, the 
location of immigrants is exogenous to current demand conditions.  The instrument is 
























= the share of immigrants from g living in city c in 1970.  Thus  ic Z assigns recent 
migrants from each country to the US cities where immigrants from their home country 
were living in 1970.   In practice, immigrants are grouped into 16 regions of origin, three of     26 
which (Cuba, the Philippines, and Mexico) are individual countries.  These regions are listed 
in Appendix Table 1. 
 
To make the first stage coefficients interpretable, I have divided the instrument by the 
average of each city’s 1980 and 1990 population.  Column 1 of Table 4 shows that the first-
stage regression is strong, which occurs for two reasons: 1) early immigrant settlements are 
indeed a strong force attracting continued immigration to a particular location, even 20 years 
later; and 2) foreign immigration is a major force shaping demographic changes in US 
metropolitan areas.  This table also shows regressions run separately by skill group (dropping 
the city fixed effect and including a control for population growth).   This reveals that the 
instrument has a relationship with labor supply changes during the 1980s for workers with 
less than a 4-year college degree, but not for more-educated workers, reflecting the fact that 
foreign immigration to the US during the late 1980s was dominated mostly by workers with 
less than a 4-year degree.  Only the combined first stage regression in the first column is 
used in the analysis that follows. 
 
Two-stage least squares estimates of the wage and employment elasticities that use this 
instrument are shown in the bottom panel of Table 3.  Because the instrument is only 
available for the subset of metropolitan areas in the 1970 Census, the middle panel shows 
the OLS estimates for this group of cities, which are similar to the full sample OLS 
estimates.  The IV estimates, however, are more negative, implying that labor flows may in 
part be driven by local demand shocks.   Wages and employment  rates  of workers are 
reduced by an increase in the local relative supply of workers with similar levels of education,     27 
but these estimates still imply that employers substitute across education types elastically.  
The elasticity estimates are 0.04 for employment and 0.09 for wages. 
 
 
Changes in Industry Mix 
Next, I ask whether a growth in the relative supply of some worker type is associated with a 
relative growth in the industries that employ that type of labor, motivated by empirical 
evaluation of equation (3).  As described in section 2, in doing so it is important to control 
for scale effects, which also could generate such a relationship, and to account for the 
influence of exogenous changes in production technology that alter the relative usage of 
different labor types.  The former is accommodated with a city fixed effect, and the latter 
with a skill group fixed effect.  Letting c index metropolitan areas, I estimate regressions of 
the form: 
 
(4)  ic ic c i ic jc j ijc L y M s e g q l + D + + = ” D ￿ % %
1980  
 
…where  ic y  is the 1980 share-weighted growth in industry scale – the expected absorption 
of type-i workers in city c in the 1980s –  ic L D %  is the growth of the number of workers in 
group i and city c and  ic e is an unobserved error term capturing, among other things, city- 
and skill-group-specific labor demand shocks, which might be correlated with  ic L D % .  The 
coefficient of interest, g , measures the share of relative supply growth of some type of labor 
absorbed by changes in industry mix that favor its employment.  Recall that under the     28 
strictest HO model, this will be 1.  Note also that, analogous to the previous section, this has 
a “second difference” interpretation: it represents the fraction of the growth in the supply of 
some skill type relative to other skill types and relative to other cities absorbed by changes in 
industry mix.  This interpretation arises here because of the inclusion of skill group and city 
fixed effects. 
 
I begin by measuring industry growth  jc M D %  with growth in the output of manufacturing 
industries.  This produces an estimated g  of 0.03, shown in the first column of Table 5, 
which is to say that changes in the education composition of a metropolitan area’s work 
force are typically associated with a change in manufacturing mix that might accommodate 3 
percent – essentially none – of the supply change.  This qualitative result is not particular to 
measuring industry growth with output.  Columns 2 and 3 show similar estimates using as 
measures of industry size the real book value of capital stock (buildings and equipment) and 
employment.  It is also not particular to the dataset being used.  Manufacturing employment 
data from the Census of Population produces a similarly small estimate of 0.01. 
 
Sectors Outside Manufacturing 
While manufacturing has the advantage of being unambiguously tradable, the sector does 
not include an exhaustive set of traded goods.  In fact, it might be quite reasonable that there 
is not much action in the manufacturing sector as it is a declining sector, employing less than 
20 percent of workers in these metropolitan areas by 1990, a number reported in the bottom 
row of Table 5.  Particularly for more skilled workers, there may be other traded industries 
that can expand to accommodate labor flows, and their omission might account for the     29 
small point estimates.  To address this, I will now add other sectors.  Doing so will require 
me henceforth to use only total employment in the Census of Population as my measure of 
industry size. 
 
A challenge is to determine which sectors can be construed as tradable and therefore should 
be included in this sum.  I know of no serious effort in the trade literature to evaluate which 
industries are tradable, though, among others, Hanson and Slaughter (2002) specify sectors 
to be considered traded and not for their analysis.  In addition to manufacturing, they 
include agriculture, mining, finance, real estate, business services, and legal services.  I will 
begin using this definition and then include all sectors, with the understanding that the latter 
may overstate the role changes in the mix of traded industries has in absorbing labor shocks. 
 
Column 5 of Table 5 limits analysis to the sectors defined as traded industries by Hanson 
and Slaughter (2002).  The bottom panel of this table shows these sectors employed about 
one-third of workers in both 1980 and 1990.  Adding these other sectors raises the estimate 
of g  only slightly, to 0.05, which is now distinguishable from zero.  Column 6 adds all other 
industries to the analysis.  Here again we get a positive estimate, but the overall effect is 
small.  The 0.07 point estimate suggests that growth in the availability of some type of 
worker is associated with a relative growth 7 percent as large of the traded and non-traded 
industries that tend to employ that type of worker. 
 
 
     30 
Endogeneity 
The OLS estimates presented so far of the short-run industry mix response to changes in 
worker mix have a causal interpretation under the assumption that changes in worker mix 
are randomly assigned to cities.  In fact, a demand shock for the output of a particular 
industry could tend to draw the types of workers employed in that industry to the locality: a 
growing apparel sector might attract dropouts, rather than vice versa.  This implies that even 
the small positive association seen so far might merely be spurious. 
 
To address this concern, a two-stage least squares estimate of (4) is also performed, using the 
instrument described above.  The results of this regression are shown in the first column of 
Table 6.  The upper panel of the table repeats the OLS estimate for all industries from the 
previous table (0.07), the middle panel shows the OLS estimate for the 90 cities for which 
the instrument is available (nearly the same – 0.08), and the bottom panel shows the IV 
estimate, which is slightly smaller (0.04) and only marginally statistically significant.  The 
endogenous response of worker mix to relative industry growth thus may have contributed 
to a slightly positive upward bias of the industry mix response; it appears that changes in 
worker mix, at least those measured by education, have almost no influence on the mix of 
industries that matters for employment. 
 
Other Types of Responses to Changes in Worker Mix 
The framework of section 2  also provides for examination of the share of labor supply 
changes absorbed through changes in the skill mix of employment, holding constant industry     31 
mix, the second term of decomposition (2).  I will look for evidence of that type of change 
by estimating the following regression: 
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In other words, I regress growth in type-i intensity of a typical industry (the share-weighted 
growth in ( jc ijc N N )) on the growth in the type-i intensity of the city’s labor supply. g¢ 
measures the elasticity of employment mix within industry to the local supply mix or, more 
simply, the share of worker mix changes absorbed within industry. 
 
Estimates of g¢ are shown in the second column of Table 6.  OLS estimates suggest half of 
all changes in labor supply are absorbed within industry, and IV estimates (using the same 
instrument) suggest that at least three-quarters are.  (Higher concentrations of employment 
of a particular type of worker are negatively associated with labor inflows of that type, 
biasing OLS downward.) Each estimate is statistically different from 1, in part because of the 
small negative impact that labor supply growth has on overall employment rates, discussed 
further below.  Another  reason is that we have not yet completed the  employment 
decomposition – there is a third term of (2) that contains the interaction of industry size and 
within-industry changes and cannot be assigned uniquely to either.  OLS estimates of this 
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1980  is the regression dependent variable are 0.3-0.4.  In the     32 
inequality literature (e.g. Autor, Katz, and Krueger (1998)) it is customary to assign half of 
this term to the  between-industry changes (column 1) and half to the within-industry 
changes (column 2) – which would imply approximately 1/3 of local labor mix changes are 
absorbed between industries and 2/3 within industry.  However, the IV estimates for the 
portion that is absorbed by this “ambiguous” or residual term are considerably smaller and 
statistically indistinguishable from zero; this says that under any decomposition, changes in 
the relative supplies of different types of workers have little impact on the relative size of 
industries that tend to employ that type of worker.  Instead, a higher relative supply of some 
worker type tends to lead to  a  nearly  proportional increase of that type in  relative 
employment within a relatively unchanged industry structure.  This occurs without much 
change in the relative wages, as we saw in Table 3, suggesting that employers operate with a 
production function – or set of production functions – that allow them to trade off flexibly 
between different types of workers. 
 
The Role of Unemployment 
Columns 1-3 of Table 6 present a decomposition of employment changes on the base of 
changes in worker supply.  To the extent that an increase in the relative supply of some type 
of worker leads to high rates of unemployment for that type (as the IV estimates in Table 3 
suggested they do), then columns 1-3 of the table would need not sum to one and, in fact, 
they do not.  The difference of the sum of columns 1-3 from one (or g ¢ ¢ ¢ from the regression   
ic ic c i ic ic iUc L y L N s e g q l ¢ ¢ ¢ + D ¢ ¢ ¢ + ¢ ¢ ¢ + ¢ ¢ ¢ = ¢ ¢ ¢ ” - D % ) ( %
1980  where 
1980
iUc s  is the share of the type-i labor 
force unemployed in 1980) is the share of changes in relative supply absorbed by changes in 
overall relative employment rates.  These numbers are shown in the fourth column of Table     33 
6.  OLS estimates suggest that 8 percent of changes in worker mix were absorbed  by 
unemployment, while IV estimates suggest that almost 20 percent were.  This estimate is 
similar to the one in the previous section, where it was found that 25 of the growth in high 
school dropout workers in some major California cities and in Miami were absorbed through 
higher relative dropout unemployment; it is also consistent with Schoeni’s (1996) finding 
that the unemployment impact of immigration was sizable during the 1980s. 
 
 
6. Changes in Computer Use and Occupation Mix 
Changes in Computer Use 
So far I have presented evidence that local labor mix changes are largely absorbed within 
industry and without much change in relative factor prices.  This might occur if technology 
is endogenously chosen to complement local worker mix.  Acemoglu (2002) suggests, for 
example, that the recent rise of computers in the workplace might be endogenously related 
to the growth in college-educated labor, which could h ave led the relative wages of the 
college-educated to rise even in the face of a large  relative supply increase.  To evaluate 
whether endogenous biased technological change could explain the lack of responsiveness of 
relative wages to relative labor supply, it is useful to ask whether  technological change 
differed across cities according to changes in their mix of workers. 
 
To evaluate this, I will use data on the prevalence of computer use in the workplace from the 
1984 and 1993 computer-use supplements to the October Current Population Survey.  
These same data were used by Autor, Katz, and Krueger (1998), who were interested in     34 
determining whether variation (across industries) in the change in computer use led to 
changes in the share of more educated workers.
 30  Here I want to use the data to investigate 
a reversed version of this hypothesis, asking whether changes in the skills of a city’s work 
force drive variation in the uptake of computers. 
 
I will again treat metropolitan areas as local labor markets.  There are 44 metropolitan areas 
that can be matched between the 1984 and 1993 CPS, and there is a surprising amount of 
variation in the growth in the prevalence of computers across these metropolitan areas.
31  In 
these 44 cities, the fraction of workers who report using a computer at work climbed by 20 
percentage points (from 30 percent to 50 percent) between 1983 and 1994; the standard 
deviation of the increase (across metro areas) is 4 percentage points.   
 
Table 7 presents a few specifications that attempt to explain the cross-city variation in the 
growth in computer use with changes in labor force attributes.  Column 1 shows that nearly 
half of the variation across cities can be explained by changes in the relative supply of four 
aggregate education groups (high school dropouts are excluded) and that computer use 
appears to be monotonically increasing in the relative supply of more educated workers.  
This is not by itself surprising as more educated workers are more likely to be employed at a 
job that uses a computer (DiNardo and Pischke (1997)).   However, even after accounting 
for the individual tendency of more educated workers to use a computer, a city’s supply of 
educated workers appears to affect the overall computer use rate.  To see this, the regression 
in column 2 uses as the dependent variable the mean residuals (in each city) from an 
                                                 
30 I use the question, as do they, which asks each worker whether they use a computer directly at work. 
31 These are the 44 largest metropolitan areas in 1983, with the city of Oakland treated as part of the San 
Francisco metropolitan area.     35 
individual level regression of computer use on education across all 44 cities.
32  (Separate 
regressions are run with the 1984 and 1993 data.)  Taking out this individual tendency of 
more educated workers to use a computer reduces but does not eliminate the effect of the 
relative supply of educated workers on the rate of computer use.  Put another way, this says 
that the same individual is more likely to use a computer at work in a city where the work 
force is more educated.   
 
Autor, Katz, and Krueger (1998) document that industries where computerization took place 
most rapidly also took on more skilled workers.  My paper has investigated the role of 
changes in industry mix in response to supply changes.  The two may be related:  the high 
rate of computer use in cities with  a more educated work force could be driven by the 
presence of more skilled industries.  To investigate this, the regression in column 3 first 
residualizes computer use  at the individual level  in both education and industry (with an 
exhaustive set of dummies for the latter) before aggregating to the city level.  This again 
reduces the coefficient on the aggregate supply measures but does not eliminate it.  What 
this says is that there is a substantial within-industry component to the effect of educated 
labor supply on the rate of computer use. 
 
Though merely suggestive, the observed correlations support the idea that technological 
change may be related to changes in local skill mix of labor supply.  The association of 
computerization with a more educated work force suggests that variation in the pace of skill-
                                                 
32 A dummy for computer use at work was regressed on dummies for high school graduate, some college, and 
college graduate and a linear term for years of education. There were 24,586 observations in the 1984 
regression and 23,089 in the 1993 regression in the 44 metropolitan areas.     36 
biased technological change across cities may have had a role in mitigating the impact of 
relative factor supplies on wages.
33 
 
Changes in Occupations 
A natural follow-up question to the results of this paper is to ask what added workers of a 
given skill type are doing within industry.  To get at this, it is possible to repeat the analyses 
of sections 4 and 5 using occupations, rather than industries, as the unit of analysis.  Results 
of this exercise indicate that most changes in skill mix are absorbed within occupation (0.76 
share).
34  In light of the results of this paper and the fact that many occupations are tied 
closely to particular industries (e.g. textile sewing machine operators are employed mostly in 
the textile industry!) this is not a big surprise.  However, it is worth pointing out for two 
reasons.  First, to the extent that  detailed occupations proxy for the mix of more finely 
disaggregated industries, it suggests that the industry results here are likely to be robust to 
further disaggregation.
35  In addition, it suggests the nature of work performed by a given 
skill type depends directly on that labor type’s presence in the local labor market, lending 





                                                 
33 It is worth noting that this result may also help explain why residual wages and total factor productivity are 
higher in labor markets with more educated workers (Moretti (2002, 2003)).  If educated workers attract skill-
biased technologies and these technologies are more productive, then residual wages and TFP would be higher 
in markets with more educated workers. 
34 Lewis (2003) performs the occupation analysis in greater detail. 
35 The Census of Population divides workers more finely into occupations than into industries. 
36Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003) show that the task content of occupations has changed over time.  It is 
entirely conceivable, therefore, that the tasks performed within a given occupation may differ across markets.     37 
7. Discussion 
Reconciliation with the Trade Literature 
Hanson and Slaughter (2002), using gross state product and state-level labor force data, 
provide evidence that large US states experienced common changes in production technique 
during the 1980s, after accounting for industry-neutral state-factor-specific productivity 
shocks, modeled by fixed effects.  This is interpreted as providing support for HO modified 
to allow factor-specific productivity differences across localities (Trefler (1993), described 
below).  This paper approaches the analysis from the other side of things: it shows changes 
in production technique not common across localities – the part of the variation Hanson and 
Slaughter remove with fixed effects – move proportionately with labor mix in that locality.  
The present study uses data that are both geographically and industrially more disaggregated 
than Hanson and Slaughter (2002), but Saad-Lessler (2003) shows even in Hanson and 
Slaughter’s data local changes in production technique are strongly related to local changes in 
factor supplies.  In addition, like me, Hanson and Slaughter (2002) find that changes in 
industry mix account for at most a small portion of local changes in worker mix. 
 
These results bear some resemblance to Trefler’s (1993) modified version of HO.  He 
showed that once factor supplies are adjusted for local productivity differences, they could 
explain the cross-sectional pattern of trade flows between countries.  However, the results 
here suggest more strongly that local changes in the relative productivity of different factors 
are what predominantly accommodate local changes in worker mix.
37   Endogenous changes 
                                                 
37It is possible to interpret this result as being consistent with a further “modified” HO theory, at some point 
HO ceases to be an informative theory about what generates trade flows and instead simply becomes an 
accounting identity.  Trefler’s (1993) paper is itself agnostic on the source of country-specific productivity 
differences, and thus tells us little about whether factor supplies in fact determine trade flows.     38 
in production technology may underlie this: I found that the skill content of occupations 
responded to the local labor supply mix and that computer use grew more quickly in cities 
where the educated work force grew more rapidly. 
 
Caveats 
There are caveats to the present research.  One is that there could be within-industry 
changes in product mix that are evaluated as changes in production technique at the level of 
aggregation used in this paper.   Recent research in trade has placed emphasis on product-
level heterogeneity (for example, Bernard and Jensen (2002)).  While the data used in this 
paper are more disaggregated than those typically available to investigations of HO, 3-digit 
industries are by no means homogeneous.   This paper did present some suggestive evidence 
that the bias from aggregation could be small: occupation mix, which might be construed as 
a proxy for more finely disaggregated industry cells, was no more responsive than industry 
mix. 
 
An alternative interpretation of these results is that education is a poor proxy for worker 
skill.  For example, a recent paper by Borjas (2003) estimates native-immigrant elasticities of 
substitution with comparisons between decennial censuses (using only time series rather than 
cross-regional comparisons).  He obtains larger estimates by looking at education-work 
experience cells than by looking at education cells alone.  The robustness of the present 
results to different definitions of skill is untested, though it is generally believed that the 
1980 Mariel boatlift was an unskilled shock to Miami’s work force, and no major changes in     39 




This paper finds using two different approaches and measuring industrial composition using 
both household and establishment data that changes in the mix of industries accommodate 
only a small part of the changes in the composition of local labor supply in US metropolitan 
areas.  In low-skill immigration cities and in US cities in general changes in industry mix did 
not tend to favor employment of newly arriving workers during the 1980s.  This suggests 
that the standard HO model is not a very good description of how local labor markets adjust 
to labor mix shocks.  It would be an overstatement to interpret these results as saying a city’s 
industry structure is unaffected by the composition of the local workforce  – I found 
evidence, for example, that low-skill workers may attract apparel production.  These results 
instead say that changes in industry mix are not a major source of adjustment to labor supply 
shocks. 
 
This paper also shows that the hiring practices of the vast majority of industries are highly 
responsive to the composition of local labor supply.  Cities that receive more of some type 
of labor increase their relative employment of that type of labor in the average industry by 80 
percent as much as the citywide supply increase.  The remainder ends up in higher rates of 
unemployment, consistent with Shoeni’s (1996) finding that immigration was associated with 
some unemployment during the 1980s.  However, the fact that large within-industry changes 
in worker mix are associated with little change in relative wages suggests that industries are     40 
choosing production  technology  to  complement local  factor  supply  mix.  More direct 
evidence for this interpretation was found in the fact that computer use grew more rapidly in 
areas with a faster relative growth in the supply of educated labor. 
 
Future research might examine in greater detail the effect of local labor mix on the use of 
capital with different degrees of skill-complementarity and the effect of this, in turn, on 
productivity.  The results would have some potential to explain how local factor-specific 
productivity differences arise, which could form the basis for a richer model of the open 
economy that is consistent with the data.     41 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA 0.12 -0.03 -0.23 0.69 -0.32 0.15
Anaheim-Santa Ana, CA 0.09 -0.04 -0.26 1.21 -0.38 0.28
Miami-Hialeah, FL 0.04 -0.03 -0.16 0.50 -0.30 0.10
Fresno, CA 0.03 -0.04 -0.16 0.93 -0.30 0.24
Santa Barbara, CA 0.03 -0.02 -0.26 0.89 -0.31 0.15
Salinas-Seaside-Monterey, CA -0.03 -0.03 -0.27 0.41 -0.35 0.22
Riverside-San Bernardino, CA -0.04 -0.03 -0.21 1.13 -0.30 0.48
(T) All "Treatment Cities"… 0.07 -0.03 -0.22 0.70 -0.32 0.20
(C) Comparison Cities
† -0.44 -0.02 -0.20 0.38 -0.52 0.00
Continental US -0.43 -0.01 -0.26 0.36 -0.37 0.16
Treatment(T) - Comparison(C) 0.51 -0.02 -0.02 0.32 0.20 0.19
(Standard Error) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.11)
Growth in Labor Force Attributes 1980-1990, Selected Regions
Table 1
Dropout/Non Dropout…
†The comparison cities (metropolitan areas) meet the criteria that they employed high school dropouts in similar industries as 
the treatment cities in 1980; see text for details.  The comparison cities are: Philadelphia, PA; Oakland, CA; San Diego, CA; 
Nassau-Suffolk, NY; St. Louis, MO; Nashville, TN; Cincinnati, OH; Middlesex-Somerset, NJ; Portland, OR; Kansas City, MO-











    Output -0.04 0.37
(0.05) (0.08)
    Employment 0.01 0.30 0.30
(0.01) (0.01)
All Industries
    Employment -0.12 0.83 1.00
(0.01) (0.02)
Fraction Absorbed..
Decomposition of Relative Growth In Dropout 
Labor Supply
Table 2
Source: US Census Bureau, CES, Annual Survey of Manufactures data and 1980 














Skill Group FE? YES YES
City FE? YES YES
Notes: See text for details.
IV, 90 Metropolitan Areas
Table 3
Wage and Employment Elasticities 
Estimated Across Metropolitan 
Areas
OLS, 179 Metropolitan Areas
OLS, 90 Metropolitan AreasIV First
Stage Dropouts Graduates <4yr degr. Graduate
Imm Supply 9.05 4.32 -8.38 -25.78 -0.13
 "Push"/Capita (1.25) (0.64) (1.70) (3.59) (2.78)
Overall Pop 1.02 0.66 1.39 1.24
 Growth
1 (0.06) (0.05) (0.08) (0.08)
R
2 0.93 0.82 0.73 0.82 0.75
Skill Group FE? YES YES YES YES YES
City FE? YES NO NO NO NO
Table 4
IV First Stage: Labor Supply Growth on Immigrant Labor Supply 
"Push" Per Capita
Dependent Variable:  Education Group Specific Labor Supply Growth
College High School
First Stage Separately By Education Level
Source: 1980, 1990 PUMS data and 1970 1% county group files.  Regression run over 90 
metropolitan areas.  See text for details of construction of the instrument and sample.
1Population growth for the city as a whole, not by skill group.  Labor supply growth is by 





90 represent the 1980 
and 1990 populations of a city c.  See text for details.Sector: H&S All
Dataset: ASM ASM ASM PUMS PUMS PUMS
Scale Measure: Output Capital
*
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Labor Supply 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.07
 Growth (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
R
2 0.86 0.86 0.83 0.91 0.93 0.98
Skill Group FE? YES YES YES YES YES YES
City FE? YES YES YES YES YES YES
1980 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.36 1.00




Percent Employed, This Sector
Changes in Worker Mix Absorbed by Changes in Industry Mix, 1980-90
Employment    Employment    Employment
Source: US Census Bureau, CES, Annual Survey of Manufactures and 1980, 1990 PUMS. Labor supply growth is by skill 














Labor Supply 0.07 0.45 0.42 0.08
 Growth (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
R
2
0.95 0.97 0.75 0.83
Labor Supply 0.08 0.52 0.32 0.08
 Growth (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01)
R
2
0.99 0.97 0.64 0.84
Labor Supply 0.04 0.74 0.08 0.17
 Growth (0.02) (0.06) (0.07) (0.02)
R
2
0.99 0.97 0.47 0.76
Skill Group FE? YES YES YES YES
City FE? YES YES YES YES
IV




OLS -- 90 IV Cities
Source: 1980, 1990 PUMS.  Change in …. (1) (2) (3)
High School Grad 0.05 0.04 -0.12
  LF/Capita (0.17) (0.17) (0.13)
Some College 0.58 0.43 0.22
  LF/Capita (0.18) (0.18) (0.14)
College Graduate 0.74 0.40 0.22
  LF/Capita (0.15) (0.15) (0.11)
Residualized in Individual Level…
Education
1 NO YES YES
Industry
2 NO NO YES
R
2 0.48 0.25 0.18
N Cities 44 44 44
Impact of Labor Force Changes on Changes in 
Computer Use, 1984-1993
Table 7
Source: 1984 and 1993 October Current Population Surveys; "Computer 
use" represents fraction of workers who report directly using a 
computer at work.  Standard errors in parentheses.  
1Individual 
level regression include a dummy for high school grad, some 
college, college grad and a linear term in years of education. 
2Industry controls are an exhaustive set of dummies for Census of 
Population (approx 3 digit) industries.Figure 1












0.000 0.001 0.010 0.100














































Source: US Census Bureau, CES, 




*1=Growth in relative supply of 
dropouts.  See text for description.Figure 2
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*1=Growth in relative supply of 
dropouts.  See text for description.Figure 3
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*1=Growth in relative supply of 
dropouts.  See text for description. 
Data Appendix 
 
1. Linking Data Sources by Industry 
Several links between data sets are made in order to carry this project.  These come in two 
classes: links by industry and links by geography.  Industry matches between the ASM and 
the labor force data are necessary because the ASM has no information on worker skills.  In 
the ASM, establishments are classified into SIC industries based upon the products they 
produce.  In the PUMS data, industry is for the most part determined by a worker’s self-
report of their primary industry of employment.
1  The Census Bureau attempts to match 
respondents’ self-reported industry in the Census to a (usually) three-digit SIC industry but is 
still left with a few manufacturing categories that have no equivalent in the ASM, as they 
describe workers as being part of an unspecified industry within an aggregate manufacturing 
category (such as “Not Specified Food” and “Not Specified Machinery”).   These industries 
are dropped for the purposes of classifying the skill content of each industry.  Implicitly, this 
assumes that workers in the unspecified aggregates are distributed across the relevant 




2. Linking Data Sources by Metropolitan Area 
Links by metropolitan areas (MAs) are made with labor force and population data to the 
ASM and with each of these across time.  In the ASM, an establishment’s county and in 
some cases more detailed geographic location are reported, which is sufficient to determine 
their metropolitan area.  The population data aren’t as specific, but it is still possible to 
construct metropolitan areas with close geographic consistency between the data sets.  In the 
1990 PUMS the smallest geographic unit is the “Public Use Micro Area,” (PUMA) and in the 
1980 and 1970 PUMS the smallest geographic unit is the “county group.”  The borders of 
these units, which change from one census to another, do not necessarily exactly overlap 
with those of metropolitan areas.  The present paper constructs MAs from the 1980 and 
1990 PUMS using tabulations from Deaton and Lubotsky (2003), who attempt to match as 
closely as possible the 1990 boundaries of MAs. They find in most cases the match is fairly 
close.
3  A worker is counted as being in an MA if he or she reports one of the component 
PUMAs as his place of residence, since place of work PUMA is missing or not as detailed for 
many workers in the 1990 PUMS.  When total worker counts by metropolitan area in the 
1980 PUMS constructed using work PUMA are plotted against worker counts constructed 
using residence PUMA, the points lie tightly on a 45 degree line. 
 
                                                 
1 In some cases a respondent’s industry is actually determined by looking up the industry of classification of the 
employer location the respondent claims to work at.  In most cases, however, the self-reported industry is 
recorded. 
2 An additional issue is linking 1980 and 1990 PUMS data by industry and by occupation.  There were some 
changes in industry classifications between the two years, but other than a small increase in the number of 
“unspecified” categories, an exact correspondence can be generated between the two by using the 1980 
classifications.  This is what I do.  For occupations, the 1980 data are more detailed, but an exact match to 
more aggregated 1990 categories can be found in all cases.  The occupational match is aided by the fact that the 
same occupational classification system underlies both the 1980 and 1990 censuses. 
3 Jaeger, Loeb, and Bound (1998) also analyze extensively how well MSAs can be matched in between 1970, 
1980 and 1990 versions of census public-use microdata.   
In the 1970 data, MAs are constructed from groups of counties that roughly approximate 
the county components of the same MAs in their 1970 definition, using code similar to 
Altonji and Card’s (1991).  This means that the match isn’t quite as good, but the larger 
inconsistency is tolerable because the 1970 data are used only for the construction of an 
instrument for labor supply changes based upon where immigrants were living in 1970.  
What is largely missing from these 1970 county groups is the outer counties of the modern 
metropolitan areas, which were relatively unpopulated in 1970.  There are also some cases of 
MAs splitting into two since 1970, in which case the match is to the larger 1990 MA.  In any 
case, the inaccuracy of the geography should not bias the results, although it may weaken the 












Mexico 921,920 0.77 0.13 0.07 0.03
Caribbean 179,540 0.48 0.25 0.19 0.07
Central America 288,960 0.67 0.17 0.11 0.06
China, HK, Singapore 210,960 0.27 0.17 0.16 0.40
South America 207,000 0.32 0.29 0.21 0.19
SE Asia/Pac. Island 195,200 0.54 0.17 0.18 0.12
Korea & Japan 197,840 0.17 0.25 0.19 0.40
Philippines 170,300 0.20 0.17 0.22 0.41
Canada, Aust/NZ/UK etc. 151,380 0.14 0.23 0.29 0.35
India, Pakistan, Centr Asia 144,460 0.20 0.15 0.16 0.50
Russia & Eastern Europe 134,400 0.25 0.28 0.19 0.29
Southwestern Europe 54,020 0.40 0.22 0.17 0.21
Northern Europe & Israel 119,820 0.16 0.22 0.25 0.37
Turkey, N. Africa, Middle East 116,720 0.22 0.22 0.24 0.32
Other Africa 59,840 0.21 0.21 0.28 0.31
Cuba 33,080 0.58 0.20 0.13 0.09
Share of 1985-90 Immigrants
Appendix Table 1
Education Distribution of Recent Immigrants, by Country Group
Source: 1990 PUMS